some thoughs

 
besides patrick seal article (i ll be c/p) after
i think that now the shiits wont have anymore interest not to be in the resistance as long as resisting wont mean anymore being on saddam side

besides that , there are risk that iraq would be under ethnical tensions as far as we are hearing about fights btw sunnits , shiits etc...

here patrick seal article

Partitioning Iraq would exacerbate America’s blunders

Most observers of the Iraqi scene are agreed that the next six months will be crucial for the country’s future – and hence for the stability of the Middle East. Why six months? Because there are signs that the Bush administration is beginning to panic. Having stormed into Iraq last March with the triumphalist objective of redrawing the geopolitical map of the region to suit American and Israeli interests, the US is now desperately looking for an exit strategy from the Iraqi quagmire.
If George W. Bush wants to be re-elected, he needs to get out of Iraq and declare “victory” well before next November’s presidential elections. The mounting costs of the war and the daily toll of American dead and wounded are steadily eroding his political prospects. In spite of the bluster of staying on to “finish the job,” the temptation is to “cut and run.”
What is amazing is that, in spite of the gross failures of policy, the neoconservative architects of the war – in the Pentagon and in Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office – are still in place. The search for scapegoats is gaining pace in Washington, but heads have not yet rolled. No doubt they will.
The situation in Iraq presents a dangerous paradox: armed resistance to the American occupation has forced Washington to announce a timetable for the transfer of sovereignty, and to appeal for help to the once-reviled United Nations. The US has pledged to hand power back to the Iraqis by next June. This means that the ambitious plan to create a “democratic Iraq” to serve as a model for the entire region has been abandoned. This change of US strategy must be judged a victory for the resistance.
But to which Iraqis will power be given? It seems unlikely that the resistance will be able to fill the vacuum of power, seeing that it is composed of different groups fighting for different reasons, with no unified political or military leadership. If there is a unified command operating underground it has so far not shown its hand.
Some rumors suggest that Saddam Hussein himself is directing the resistance. But even diehard Iraqi Baathists do not believe he has the faintest chance of returning to power. As a prominent Iraqi told me this week, “Saddam is politically and morally dead!” The resistance is not fighting for Saddam. It is fighting against America. Iraqis of all communities have suffered too much from Saddam to contemplate his return, even for an instant.
To protect its forces from lethal attacks – such as the car-bomb that wounded nearly 50 GIs this week – there is talk of the United States withdrawing from the Falluja and Ramadi areas. But this would create a “capital of the resistance,” a safe haven from which even more lethal attacks could be mounted.
Having failed to turn Iraq into a stronghold of American and Israeli influence in the heart of the Arab world, some right-wing American strategists are now promoting what they see as the next best thing – a weak Iraq partitioned between its three major communities. That is what Leslie Gelb, a former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, advocated in an influential article entitled “The Three-State Solution” published in the Nov. 25 edition of The New York Times. His article sparked a vigorous debate about the merits and demerits of partition.
Gelb wants to create three mini-states – Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shiites in the south – with boundaries drawn as closely as possible along ethnic and sectarian lines. He makes no secret that “the general idea is to strengthen the Kurds and Shiites and weaken the Sunnis.” America, he says, should put most of its money with the first two, while extricating its forces from the so-called Sunni Triangle. Without oil or oil revenues, the “troublesome and domineering Sunnis” would be forced to moderate their ambitions. He recognizes that chopping up Iraq might be “a messy and dangerous enterprise,” but recommends that the US pay for the inevitable population movements and impose partition by force. He is in effect recommending that the US inflict on Iraq the horrors of ethnic cleansing.
In calling for the creation of three mini-states, Gelb goes beyond the federal or confederal solution that some neocons and their friends among former Iraqi exiles have long advocated. There is a lot wrong with dismantling the Iraqi state.
It is important to be aware that those promoting these ideas want to see Iraq weak rather than strong, and, by the same token, the Arab world weak rather than strong. The declared objective is to “de-Arabize” Iraq, to put an end to its pan-Arab ambitions, and thereby to fragment the Arab system, laying it open to penetration, manipulation and control. This is a recipe for destabilizing the Middle East, including such states as Israel and even Kuwait, which might imagine that they have something to gain from a weakened and partitioned Iraq. Yet an Iraq at war with itself and providing a haven for extremists of all colorings is in no one’s interest.
Of all Iraq’s communities, only the Kurds favor partition or, if that cannot be obtained, a federal solution. The trouble is that, as everyone knows, the Kurds would not be satisfied with the three provinces where they predominate. They want more. Although Kirkuk is a city of mixed population, the Kurds would claim they need it for its oil. Any such ambition would probably trigger Turkish intervention, as well as the armed opposition of other Iraqi communities. The division of Iraq’s oil resources and revenues between the various mini-states would be a major headache and an inevitable source of conflict. The Gelb “solution” could sow the seeds of civil war.
The Kurds have two major militias under arms, totaling some 70,000 men. All three Shiite parties have militias of their own. The Sunnis have a long tradition of serving in the army and could no doubt quickly assemble a major fighting force if the need arose. Their talent for guerrilla operations against an overwhelmingly strong American army has now been demonstrated.
The Americans have blundered in Iraq. Redrawing the Middle East map was always a pipe dream. Disbanding the Iraqi Army, apparently on Israel’s urging, has proved to be the greatest source of trouble. Sending home 150,000 officers with no pay has created the pool of angry talent from which the resistance has sprung. Adopting Israeli iron-fist tactics – sealing off towns and villages, destroying houses and training Special Forces to assassinate militants – is the best way to make oneself hated and to lose the “battle for hearts and minds.” Threatening Iran and Syria with sanctions and worse, instead of seeking their aid in stabilizing Iraq, is yet another strategic blunder. The two states have considerable assets in Iraq that they will not hesitate to use against the US if their vital interests are threatened.
Of all America’s blunders, however, partition would be the most grievous. It would be a disaster for Iraq and the final nail in the coffin of America’s reputation in the region.

Patrick Seale, a veteran Middle East analyst, wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR

posted by francois at lundi, décembre 15, 2003